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In his post, Raphael Schäfer provides a considerate, careful and kind re-reading
of my dissertation on Hermann Mosler and West German international legal
scholarship after 1945. Raphael makes, by and large, three critical remarks.
First, he indicates that my exploration of alternative conceptions to the practice-
oriented method might be a misfit. Second, he wonders whether I overemphasize
Mosler’s formative influence on German international legal scholarship. And third,
he suggests that I should have engaged more thoroughly with Mosler’s underlying
theory of international law. Before I respond to these thoughtful and very welcome
comments, I take issue with the hero story Raphael seems to recognize in my work.
On heroization
Raphael writes rather casually that I chose “an imminent international legal scholar
as the hero of [my] book”. In another passage, he refers to Mosler as “Lange’s
hero”. Thereby he puts my work in a scholarly tradition of biographical writing which
highlights the lawyer’s contribution to the field and presents him (only very rarely her)
as a role model for future generations.
Of course, after publication the author loses ownership over the interpretation of
his or her work. User manuals on how to read one’s scholarly work do not lead
very far. Nonetheless, I suggest that my book does not have to be understood as a
“Heldenepos”. I have to grant Raphael that, by calling Mosler a “Wegbereiter” I might
invite the hero connotation. However, as I indicate, I define the term “Wegbereiter”
as a precursor of some method or concept, be it good or bad, rather than as
a pioneer of something one should subscribe to. Furthermore, I explain in my
introduction, that I chose Mosler to explore the origins of the practice-oriented
method and conception of global constitutionalism because of his formative influence
on the discipline (see next point) and because I could rely on rich archival material.
I detect various factors and motivations which explain his methodological and
conceptual inclinations without embracing them as convincing or exposing their
flaws. Instead, because I understand my research as empirical and analytical, I
opted for trying – as much as possible – to leave it to the reader to make his or her
own judgment.
Even though my work is clearly no deconstructive exercise, some of my findings
might call for criticism of Mosler’s approaches. For instance, is the argument
convincing that theoretical approaches had been discredited by National Socialist
Großraum theory given that the anti-Semitic Blutschutzgesetze received formalist
legal commentary and that the Berlin Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative Public
Law and International Law had legally justified anti-Versailles policies throughout the
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1930s? Might the Catholic natural law background of Mosler’s 1974 Hague lecture
with its reliance on “constitutional elements” in international law be an argument
against global constitutionalism’s potential as a universal theory? I submit that in this
sense my work invites for critical reflection.
On “the” German approach
For Raphael, my chapter on alternative approaches to international law in West
German scholarship seems somewhat foreign. The motivations behind the
alternatives are not explained and not connected rigorously enough with Mosler’s
perspective.
By including Wilhelm Grewe’s historic-political, Wilhelm Wengler’s theoretic-
sociological and Ulrich Scheuner’s philosophic-historical perspective, I tried to avoid
creating the impression that “the German approach” exclusively consists of practice-
orientation. Since historical studies have a tendency to focus on the dominating
approach, it is highly important also to engage with alternatives scholarly avenues,
even if they do not end up becoming mainstream. Furthermore, I indicate that these
alternative approaches stem from lines of thought in German legal scholarship
predominant in the 1920s and 1930s. Raphael is right that more explanation could
have been done. But since this would have somewhat shifted the focus away from
Mosler as my narrative center, I think it is fair to leave this to someone else.
On formative influence
Raphael questions whether I provided enough evidence that Mosler “shaped
German international legal scholarship.” The evidentiary bar for such a claim
remains in the eye of the beholder. Yet in Mosler’s case I think I can be quite
confident. As I demonstrate, Mosler supervised 10 Habilitanden (long-term postdoc
researchers), many more than any other German international lawyer. All of these
lawyers received chairs for public, European and/or international law at West
German universities and subscribed to the practice-oriented method often referring
to Mosler and the Heidelberg Max Planck Institute as their intellectual cradle. This
led outside observers to even speak of the “scuola di Heidelberg”. Moreover, I
emphasize that Christian Tomuschat and Jochen Frowein in their post-cold war
works on the constitutionalization of international law, referenced Mosler’s 1974
Hague lecture ideas about “constitutional elements”. In this sense, Mosler’s legacy is
still visible in contemporary debates about practice-orientation and interdisciplinarity
as well as pragmatism and constitutionalization in (German) international legal
scholarship.
On theories of international law
Raphael argues that “unfortunately, the book has only little to say on Mosler’s
position vis-à-vis the theory of international law” and wonders about Mosler’s
“underlying understanding” of the law. In my view, however, in some sense the
whole book is about Mosler’s “theory” in the context of German international legal
scholarship. I submit that what I call method and conception can also be understood
as “theory” if one defines a theory as “ideas that are suggested to explain a fact or
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event” (Cambridge Dictionary). With his practice-oriented method, Mosler intended to
explain the normative content of the international legal system. With his conception
of “international society as an international legal community” he put forward his
understanding of the role of international law in international relations. Moreover,
Mosler based parts of his Hague lecture on natural law theories, borrowing from
Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez and Alfred Verdross. Even though – as
Raphael rightly senses – Mosler would probably never have called his own work a
theory, it is hard to see how Mosler’s work could be grounded in an even deeper
layer of “theory” which brings all the pieces together.
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